I just passed the Certified Cloud Security Practitioner (CCSP) exam. It wasn’t easy, but nothing you can’t prepare for.
Apart from the official (ISC)2 guides, here are some of the resources I used in my studies:
- Cloud Security Alliance Security Guidance v4.0
- Cloud Security Alliance Enterprise Architecture
- Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Mobile Computing
- CSA Cloud Controls Matrix
- The ‘Treacherous Twelve’ Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2016
- ENISA Cloud Security Publications
- NIST SP 800-146 Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations
- NIST Special Publication 500-299 Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture (Draft)
- OWASP Top 10
If you would prefer to add video lectures to your study plan, there’s a free course on Cybrary. For a quick summary, check out these study notes and mindmaps. Also, multiple sets of free flashcards are available on Quizlet.
It is a good idea to do some practice questions: there are books and mobile apps out there to help you with this. Practical experience in cloud security is also essential.
The exam tests your knowledge of the following CCSP domains:
- Architectural Concepts and Design Requirements
- Cloud Data Security
- Cloud Platform and Infrastructure Security
- Cloud Application Security
- Legal and Compliance
The structure and format might change as (ISC)2 continuously revise their exams, so please check the official website to make sure you are up-to-date with the latest developments.
On the day, read the questions carefully. It’s not a time pressured exam (I was done in two hours), so it’s worth re-reading the questions and answers again to make sure you are answering exactly what is being asked. Eliminate the wrong options first and then decide on the best out of the remaining ones.
Finally, my suggestion would be to approach the questions from the perspective of a consultant. What would you recommend in each situation? Don’t go too technical – keep the business needs in mind at all times.
Don’t stress too much about the final result. I’m sure you’ll pass, but even if not on your first attempt, you’ll learn either way! Remember, the knowledge you accumulate in the process of preparing for the test itself has the most value, not the credential.
I’ve recently passed my AWS Certified Solutions Architect – Associate exam. In this blog I would like to share some preparation tips that would help you ace it.
Not only practice makes perfect, some hands-on experience is also a prerequisite for the exam. So there is really no way around that! But what if you didn’t have a chance to use your skills on a real-world project yet? No problem! AWS gives you a opportunity to learn how their cloud components work through AWS Free Tier. For one year, you can use Amazon EC2 , Amazon S3, Amazon RDS, AWS IoT and many more free of charge,
You want more guidance? Qwiklabs developed a set of labs that specifically designed to help you prepare for this exam. For a small price, you can complete exercises without even requiring an AWS account or signing up for Free Tier.
I recommend studying AWS Whitepapers to broaden your technical understanding. If you are short on time, focus on these:
- Overview of Amazon Web Services
- Architecting for the Cloud: AWS Best Practices
- How AWS Pricing Works
- Compare AWS Support Plans
AWS developed a freecself-paced Cloud Practitioner Essential course, to help you develop an overall understanding of the AWS Cloud. You will learn basic cloud concepts and AWS services, security, architecture, pricing, and support.
There is also a YouTube channel with free introductory videos and other noteworthy material.
Exam sample questions can help you check your knowledge and highlight areas requiring more study.
Remember, the best preparation for the exam is practical experience: AWS recommend 1+ years of hands-on experience with their technologies.
When you’re ready, go ahead and schedule an exam here.
Your company has decided to adopt Cloud. Or maybe it was among the ones that relied on virtualised environments before it was even a thing? In either case, cloud security has to be managed. How do you go about that?
Before checking out vendor marketing materials in search of the perfect technology solution, let’s step back and think of it from a governance perspective. In an enterprise like yours, there are a number of business functions and departments with various level of autonomy. Do you trust them to manage business process-specific risk or choose to relieve them from this burden by setting security control objectives and standards centrally? Or maybe something in-between?
Managing security centrally allows you to uniformly project your security strategy and guiding policy across all departments. This is especially useful when aiming to achieve alignment across business functions. It helps when your customers, products or services are similar across the company, but even if not, centralised governance and clear accountability may reduce duplication of work through streamlining the processes and cost-effective use of people and technology (if organised in a central pool).
If one of the departments is struggling financially or is less profitable, the centralised approach ensures that overall risk is still managed appropriately and security is not neglected. This point is especially important when considering a security incident (e.g. due to misconfigured access permissions) that may affect the whole company.
Responding to incidents in general may be simplified not only from the reporting perspective, but also by making sure due process is followed with appropriate oversight.
There are, of course, some drawbacks. In the effort to come up with a uniform policy, you may end up in a situation where it loses its appeal. It’s now perceived as too high-level and out of touch with real business unit needs. The buy-in from the business stakeholders, therefore, might be challenging to achieve.
Let’s explore the alternative; the decentralised model.
This approach is best applied when your company’s departments have different customers, varied needs and business models. This situation naturally calls for more granular security requirements preferably set at the business unit level.
In this scenario, every department is empowered to develop their own set of policies and controls. These policies should be aligned with the specific business need relevant to that team. This allows for local adjustments and increased levels of autonomy. For example, upstream and downstream operations of an oil company have vastly different needs due to the nature of activities they are involved in. Drilling and extracting raw materials from the ground is not the same as operating a petrol station, which can feel more like a retail business rather than one dominated by industrial control systems.
Another example might be a company that grew through a series of mergers and acquisitions where acquired companies retained a level of individuality and operate as an enterprise under the umbrella of a parent corporation.
With this degree of decentralisation, resource allocation is no longer managed centrally and, combined with increased buy-in, allows for greater ownership of the security programme.
This model naturally has limitations. These have been highlighted when identifying the benefits of the centralised approach: potential duplication of effort, inconsistent policy framework, challenges while responding to the enterprise-wide incident, etc. But is there a way to combine the best of both worlds? Let’s explore what a hybrid model might look like.
The middle ground can be achieved through establishing a governance body setting goals and objectives for the company overall, and allowing departments to choose the ways to achieve these targets. What are the examples of such centrally defined security outcomes? Maintaining compliance with relevant laws and regulations is an obvious one but this point is more subtle.
The aim here is to make sure security is supporting the business objectives and strategy. Every department in the hybrid model in turn decides how their security efforts contribute to the overall risk reduction and better security posture.
This means setting a baseline of security controls and communicating it to all business units and then gradually rolling out training, updating policies and setting risk, assurance and audit processes to match. While developing this baseline, however, input from various departments should be considered, as it is essential to ensure adoption.
When an overall control framework is developed, departments are asked to come up with a specific set of controls that meet their business requirements and take distinctive business unit characteristics into account. This should be followed up by gap assessment, understanding potential inconsistencies with the baseline framework.
In the context of the Cloud, decentralised and hybrid models might allow different business units to choose different cloud providers based on individual needs and cost-benefit analysis. They can go further and focus on different solution types such as SaaS over IaaS.
As mentioned above, business units are free to decide on implementation methods of security controls providing they align with the overall policy. Compliance monitoring responsibilities, however, are best shared. Business units can manage the implemented controls but link in with the central function for reporting to agree consistent metrics and remove potential bias. This approach is similar to the Three Lines of Defence employed in many organisations to effectively manage risk. This model suggests that departments themselves own and manage risk in the first instance with security and audit and assurance functions forming second and third lines of defence respectively.
We’ve looked at three different governance models and discussed their pros and cons in relation to Cloud. Depending on the organisation the choice can be fairly obvious. It might be emerging naturally from the way the company is running its operations. All you need to do is fit in the organisational culture and adopt the approach to cloud governance accordingly.
The point of this article, however, is to encourage you to consider security in the business context. Don’t just select a governance model based on what “sounds good” or what you’ve done in the past. Instead, analyse the company, talk to people, see what works and be ready to adjust the course of action.
If the governance structure chosen is wrong or, worse still, undefined, this can stifle the business instead of enabling it. And believe me, that’s the last thing you want to do.
Be prepared to listen: the decision to choose one of the above models doesn’t have to be final. It can be adjusted as part of the continuous improvement and feedback cycle. It always, however, has to be aligned with business needs.
|Centralised model||Decentralised model||Hybrid model|
|A single function responsible for all aspects of a Cloud security: people, process, technology, governance, operations, etc.||Strategic direction is set centrally, while all other capabilities are left up to existing teams to define.||Strategy, policy, governance and vendors are managed by the Cloud security team; other capabilities remain outside the Cloud security initiative.|
Organisations around the world are increasingly relying on third-party vendors to provide them with competitive advantage. Many companies in a race to optimise processes and reduce costs begin to outsource core functions. This leads to increased risk profile and new challenges of supplier oversight.
Dealing with third-parties has grown bigger than being just a procurement issue. Suppliers companies increasingly rely on, pose not only legal but also reputational risks that cannot be fully transferred. Security and privacy related incidents related to third-party providers are presenting new management challenges. Moreover, regulators are increasingly demanding the management of the third-party risk.
Suppliers, however, have their own challenges. Constant squeeze on costs from their clients reduces the profit margins making it increasingly difficult for vendors to prioritise security requirements implementation.
How do we make sure the suppliers we work with are trustworthy? How do we minimise the risk exposure from a potential incident? What level of assurance is required for a supplier?
These are the questions I’m going to answer in this blog.
Understanding business drivers and goals is essential for developing a third-party risk management approach. By analysing company’s corporate strategy I was able to derive multiple business attributes relevant to the shareholders. One of them stands out: Trusted. I’m going to disregard other attributes and focus on this one for the purposes of this case study. Not only it is important for the company to be trusted by its customers, but trustworthiness is also something I’m going to explore in this blog from the third-party relationship standpoint.
After a workshop with the CIO and IT managers in various business units, I’ve defined the following IT attributes supporting the main business attribute (Trusted): Transparent, Assured and Managed.
How does the security function support the wider IT objectives and corresponding attributes? After a number of workshops and analysing the security strategy document I’ve managed to create a number of security attributes. Below is a simplified example correlating to the business and IT attributes in scope:
Dealing with customers and managing relationships with them is one of the core activities of the company. As discussed above, being trusted by the customers is one of the main values of the organisation. IT department through the implementation of their technology strategy supported the business stakeholders in Sales and Marketing to outsource customer relationship management platform to a third party provider. A cloud-based solution has been chosen to fulfill this requirement.
A combination of attribute profiling, trust modelling and risk analysis is used to assess the degree of assurance required and compare third-party providers. Below is a recommended approach based on the attributes defined.
Security attributes mapping
Based on the internal security policy the following questionnaire has been developed to assess the supplier. Responses from the supplier have been omitted to preserve confidentiality. Below is a short excerpt from one of the sections of the questionnaire related to cloud services.
|Are terms of services and liabilities clearly defined in service agreements?||Governed|
|Are escrow arrangements in supplier contract agreement and cloud service agreements registered with procurement and documented in cloud service register.||Identified|
|Are physical security and environmental controls present in the data centre that contains company data?||Integrated|
|Are procedures for user authentication, authorization and access termination documented?||Access-Controlled|
|Has the Business Continuity Plan been reviewed and approved by the executive management?||Governed|
|How often is the Business Continuity Plans and Disaster Recovery Plans tested?||Available|
|Is there a specific Recovery Time Objective(s) (RTO) and Recovery Point Objective(s) (RPO)? If yes, specify the RTO and RPO for the company services.||Available|
|Are default settings customized to implement strong encryption for authentication and transmission?||Access-Controlled|
Attribute compliance is assessed based on the questionnaire answers, as every question is mapped to a specific attribute. Where a specific combination of an attribute corresponds to multiple questions, all answers are rated separately then an average rating for that attribute weight is calculated. Exceptions apply where certain specific questions are identified to have priority (higher level of impact on attribute compliance) over the other questions mapped to the same attribute. Expert judgement is applied to analyse such situations.
Attributes are evaluated with three main levels:
- High level of compliance with policy (Green),
- Medium level of compliance with policy (Amber),
- Low level of compliance with policy (Red)
In 2013 the Cloud Security Alliance released a report, which identifies and describes 9 significant threats to Cloud computing . This report was conducted through a survey of experts and intends to help companies in their Risk assessment. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is one of the first nonprofit organizations that have tried to set up standards for best practices for secure cloud computing. They further try to offer guidance and security education.
The identified threats are listed in accordance to their severity:
1. Data Breaches: Data breaches occur when sensitive information of a company falls into the hands of its competitors and cloud computing introduces new ways of attack [1,3].
2. Data Loss: Data Loss can happen in several ways and is a terrifying thought for businesses. Accidental deletions by the CSP or physical catastrophes are examples of possible ways of loosing data in the cloud. Another example is if the consumer encrypts the data before uploading it to the cloud but then looses the encryption key [1, 3].
3. Account or Service Traffic Hijacking: There are different ways an account can be hijacked such as social engineering. If an attacker is able to get access to an account he can access, for example, sensitive data, manipulate it, and also redirect transactions [3, 9].
4. Insecure APIs: Services provided by CSPs can be accessed through APIs and therefore the security of the cloud depends also highly on the security of these APIs. Weak credentials, insufficient authorization checks and insufficient input-data validation are some problems that can arise with APIs [3, 9].
5. Denial of Service (DoS): Cloud System Resources are being overused by an attacker, which prevent users from being able to access their data or applications [1, 3].
6. Malicious insiders: This threat refers to the fraud, damage or theft of information and misuse of IT resources caused from inside the CSP [3, 9].
7. Abuse of Nefarious Use: CSP are known to have weak registration processes and therefore can give easy access to attackers. Possible impacts include decoding and cracking of passwords and executing malicious commands [1, 3].
8. Insufficient due diligence: Some companies do not have the right resources and understanding of the cloud environment to correctly evaluate the risk associated with responsibilities. Some implications can be contractual issues and operational and architectural issues .
9. Shared Technology Vulnerabilities: This threat can occur in all service models and refers to the fact that a single vulnerability could compromise the entire provides cloud .
Vulnerabilities in the Cloud
Vulnerability is the second factor companies have to consider when assessing the risk of migrating data to the cloud. Even though many types of vulnerabilities exist, when identifying them it is important to make sure they are cloud specific.
What makes a Vulnerability cloud specific?
According to the research conducted in  there are several criteria, which can be met by a vulnerability to make it cloud specific.
- Virtualization, service- oriented architecture and cryptography are examples of core technologies of cloud computing. A Vulnerability is cloud specific if it is frequent and fundamental to these core technologies.
- Elasticity, resource pooling and pay-as-you go mode are example on the other hand of cloud characteristics . A Vulnerability is cloud specific if its root cause is in one of those characteristics.
- Another criteria that makes a vulnerability cloud specific is if it hard to implement existing security controls to cloud innovations.
- The last criteria they mention is that it has to be frequent in established state-of-the-art cloud services
Knowing what makes a vulnerability cloud specific one can then identify vulnerabilities in the cloud. The paper  has identified in total 7 major vulnerabilities of cloud computing:
1 Session Riding and Hijacking: This vulnerability is related to web applications weaknesses. Session Hijacking is unauthorized access is gained through a valid session key . Session riding on the other hand is when the attacker sends commands to a web application by tricking the user open an email or to visit a malicious website .
2. Reliability and Availability of Service: This vulnerability takes into consideration that cloud computing is not perfect. More and more service are built on top of cloud computing infrastructures. In case of a failure a large amount of Internet based services and applications may stop working. The paper  give the example of an event in 2008 when Amazon’s Web Service cloud storage infrastructure went down for several hours. This caused data loss and access issues.
3. Insecure Cryptography: One of the fundamental problems in cryptography is the random generation of numbers. If numbers used in cryptographic algorithm are not truly random flaws can be found easily. The Virtual machines used on the cloud do not have enough sources of entropy and are therefore susceptible to attacks .
4. Data Protection and Portability: This vulnerability addresses the questions of what happens with the sensitive data in case of contract termination or in case the CSP goes out of business .
5. Virtual Machine Escape: This vulnerability refers to the possibility of breaking out of a virtual machine and interacting with the host operating system. Given that many virtual machine can exist in the same location increases the attack surface for the attacker .
6 Vendor Lock-in: The vulnerability lies in companies being dependent on the CSP they have initially chosen. Inconsistencies between CSPs and lack of standards make it hard for companies to switch providers .
7. Internet Dependency: Cloud Computing is very much dependent on the Internet. Users usually access services through web browsers. Some critical operation such as Healthcare systems needs to be up and running 24 hours. The question arises in situations where the Internet is not reliable .
Having identified the risks of cloud computing it is then possible to assess which data or applications should be migrated and how much security is needed. Further, it is possible to come up with countermeasures or safeguards to mitigate these risks. Countermeasures may come in various forms such as policies, procedures, software configurations, and hardware devices .
For the threats and vulnerabilities mentioned in this report there exist countermeasures that can help mitigate the risk. Papers such as , , and  give possible solutions to these risks. Some of them are for example Identity and access management guidance for the threat of account or service hijacking . The CSA has issued a report to provide a list of best practices such as separation of duties and identity management . For the threat of data leakage for example the main countermeasure is encryption [8, 6].
Even though there are many countermeasures that have been identified a good practice for companies is to have a good Service Level agreement (SLA) with the CSP. SLAs are the only legal agreement between client and service provider and should cover aspects such as security policies and their implantation and also should discuss legal issues in case of misuse of services . The CSA further has come up with a framework that can assist in looking at the aspects of Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) in a company’s IT policy when adopting a new solution. Their framework assists in assessing Clouds provided by CSPs against established best practices and standards.
We have looked at Threats and Vulnerabilities and come to conclude that there are still several issues to cloud computing that need to be solved. Therefore, it is only understandable that companies still view cloud computing skeptical and do not adopt it as an option without consideration. Companies themselves should ensure through service level agreements that they get the security they need. Further we are able to see through organizations such as the Cloud Security Alliance that there are efforts in trying to create standards and help companies in choosing the right provider.
 Bamiah, Mervat Adib, and Sarfraz Nawaz Brohi. “Seven Deadly Threats and Vulnerabilities in Cloud Computing.” International Journal of Advanced Engineering Sciences and Technologies (IJAEST) (2011).
 Brunette, Glenn, and Rich Mogull. “Security guidance for critical areas of focus in cloud computing v2. 1.” Cloud Security Alliance (2009): 1-76.
 Cloud Security Alliance, “The Notorious Nine Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013”, Cloud Security Alliance, 2013, [Online]
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 Kandukuri, Balachandra Reddy, V. Ramakrishna Paturi, and Atanu Rakshit. “Cloud security issues.” In Services Computing, 2009. SCC’09. IEEE International Conference on, pp. 517-520. IEEE, 2009.
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A major UK-based telecommunications company proposed to conduct a joint research with MSc Information Security students at UCL.
The use of cloud computing as a way of providing and consuming on-demand, pay-as-you-consume ICT service has revolutionised the industry. Services like Amazon EC2 have seen a huge increase in its revenue. However, currently it is the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that are leading the way in the use of these public Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offerings.
The company envisages that as these services become more mature and secure, they will be adopted and used by more “traditional” enterprises like the finance, health and government sector.
Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) plays a very important role in the IT policies of these institutions and as such, for any solution to be adopted by them, these aspects of the IT policies will have to be considered. Several initiatives have been started to address this issue. The Cloud Security Alliance’s GRC Stack is one of the most mature and accepted initiative in this area. It consists of four main stacks – Cloud Controls Matrix, Consensus Assessments Initiative, Cloud Audit and Cloud Trust Protocol.
It was very interesting to participate in the series of workshops to investigate how this framework would impact and be used by the company. This helped me to learn a lot about the telecoms industry and the way they are adopting cloud technologies in a secure way.
According to the statistical survey  security is one of the main concerns for enterprises when making the decision to outsource their applications and infrastructure to the cloud computing environment
The inability to clearly identify where the sensitive data is stored and how it is processed is a major concern of many companies.
The problem becomes more serious when the enterprise processes cards payments and has to comply with regulatory requirements, such as PCI DSS. A need for compliance of the infrastructure with regulatory requirements plays an important role when having to decide whether to move applications or infrastructure to the cloud.
This chapter will identify specific requirements for PCI DSS compliance in a cloud computing environment and will look at research done in the field of continuous auditing.
1. PCI DSS compliance and virtualization
Virtualization, which serves as a foundation for cloud computing, introduces new unique types of risks that must be taken into consideration when deciding on adopting cloud computing in cardholder data environment. 
To address these concerns and to achieve PCI DSS compliance in such environment, PCI Security Standards Council issued “PCI DSS Virtualization Guidelines,” providing an example of how scope and responsibility may differ by type of cloud service (Figure 1) 
Figure 1 – Area of responsibility by type of cloud service 
In their supplement guidance PCI Security Standards Council also focuses on following risks :
– Vulnerabilities in the Physical Environment Apply in a Virtual Environment
– Hypervisor Creates New Attack Surface
– Increased Complexity of Virtualized Systems and Networks
– More Than One Function per Physical System
– Mixing Virtual machines of Different Trust Levels
– Lack of Separation of Duties
– Dormant Virtual Machines
– Virtual machines Images and Snapshots
– Immaturity of Monitoring Solutions
– Information Leakage between Virtual Network Segments
– Information Leakage between Virtual Components
For each risk they provide a set of recommendations, specifically covering compliance aspects of the cloud computing environment.
2. Continuous compliance monitoring in cloud computing environment
Ensuring the compliance of outsourced business processes to regulatory requirements is one of the key problems in the deployment of cloud computing environment , 
Some research has been done in the field of developing models to automate the process of continuous auditing in order to ensure adherence to regulatory requirements.
Building on Speeter’s research , Chieu, Viswanathan, and Gupta in their work , push the concept further and not only provide solutions on gathering information on network and server configuration, but also provide a tool to automate this process and use collected evidence for assurance purposes.
The researchers acknowledge all possible benefits of cloud computing, but mention that “the steps of validating the configuration and security of the target workload for compliance and assuring its quality may be complex and very time consuming.” Emphasizing the difficulties of the validation process when performed manually, the authors present the design of an automation system (Figure 2) to carry out the validation of configuration on target cloud services for compliance .
Figure 2 – Architecture of the automation system for service activation 
The authors describe in detail how to use the presented system to collect and verify all collected evidences and ensure adherence with the regulatory requirements in the cloud computing environment. This development makes a large practical contribution, and supports various operating systems and middleware stacks. It also was deployed in shared private enterprise cloud (IBM SmartCloud Enterprise Plus . However, authors acknowledge that the developed system “lacks the flexibility to support the diverse private cloud environments in which different back-end tools may have to be integrated.”  Allowing such flexibility may result in wider adoption and use for practical purposes, such as automation of PCI DSS compliance checks.
Acknowledging the contribution of Breaux and Antón’s research  Accorsi and Sato claim that there is still no sufficient research results to support creation of a uniform way of expressing the compliance requirements . Moreover, in their paper, the researchers emphasize the absence of tools for automating certification procedures, and that the “multitude of regulations and contractual rules increases the complexity of checking compliance” .
The authors analyze some regulatory requirements and develop nine common categories. They then focus on workflows and create Petri net , , ,  representation of these categories. They use the developed model to check the compliance of a given business process in relation to a given requirements. In case of non-compliance, the developed model gathers necessary evidence and points out to the problem.
Unlike Sadiq, Governatori, Namiri , who focus only on a single legislation, Accorsi and Sato present their categorization using several different legislations, which may be beneficial for cloud service providers who need to comply simultaneously with many different regulations. However, in their research, the authors analyze mainly business process design issues and only several legislations, ignoring, for example, PCI DSS and, more importantly, many requirements which may be specific for this legislation.
Hizver and Chiueh in their paper  tackle another side of automated compliance monitoring – discovering credit card flow, which is a pre-requisite to the implementation of PCI DSS.
Their research has valuable practical application, because in order to comply with PCI DSS requirements, merchants must understand how credit card data flows in their information technology infrastructure and must document it. This may result in problems with out-of-date and difficult to maintain documentation of this flow when infrastructure changes.
To avoid manual effort, the authors develop a tool that can discover payment card data flow from distributed systems in an automated manner. The foundation of the tool is virtual machine introspection technology .
Researchers present and thoroughly analyze the developed tool and show evidence that it can fulfill its purpose, despite the fact that communications between distributed systems are encrypted.
Existing issues with compliance monitoring prevent companies from outsourcing their application and infrastructure to a third party cloud computing environment  and slow down the process of realization of the cloud computing potential .
Although some positive results are achieved in the field of identifying problems with cloud computing and compliance, more research should be done in the field of automation of continuous monitoring for PCI DSS requirements in a cloud computing environment. Models should be developed and tested to allow companies to ensure their adherence with requirements not only of application, but also of external environment, especially if outsourced to third parties.
 IDC Survey (2009) http://blogs.idc.com/ie/?p=730
 PCI DSS Virtualization Guidelines (2011) https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Virtualization_InfoSupp_v2.pdf
 ENISA (2009)” Cloud computing—benefits, risks and recommendations for information security”. European Network Information and Security Agency
 Cloud Security Alliance (2013)” Top threats to cloud computing”
 Speeter, Framba, Duncan, Talla, Bullis, (2006) “Configuration management system and method of discovering configuration data”, US Patent Pub. No. 20060179116
 Chieu, Viswanathan, Gupta (2012) “Automation System for Validation of Configuration and Security Compliance in Managed Cloud Services”
 IBM SmartCloud, http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/us/en/
 Breaux, Antón (2008) “Analyzing regulatory rules for privacy and security requirements”. IEEE Trans Software Eng 34(1) p.5–20
 Accorsi, Sato (2011) “Automated Certification for Compliant Cloud-based Business Processes” DOI 10.1007/s12599-011-0155-7
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 Sadiq, Governatori, Namiri (2007) “Modeling control objectives for business process compliance. Business process management”. Springer LNCS 4714: p.149–164
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